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A STUTE OBSERVATION: RE-EXAMINING
WASHINGTON’S ENFORCEMENT OF WORKPLACE
SAFETY REGULATIONS
Ben Moore*
Abstract: In 1973, the Washington State Legislature enacted the Washington Industrial
Safety and Health Act. The stated purpose of the Act was to ensure safe working conditions
for the working men and women of Washington. Seventeen years later, the Washington State
Supreme Court held that general contractors are per se liable for the WISHA violations of their
subcontractors. However, the Washington Department of Labor and Industries has adopted a
policy of citing general contractors for subcontractor violations only in limited circumstances.
This Comment first outlines the development of worker safety laws in Washington, then
examines the effects of the Department’s policy at both the administrative and appellate level.
Finally, this Comment argues that the Department’s policy is contrary to the governing law
and should be altered to be in line with the law, avoid potential confusion on appeal, and fulfill
the purpose of WISHA: to protect Washington’s workers.

INTRODUCTION
In December 2016, approximately 193,000 people in Washington
worked on a construction site.1 Over the course of that year, 14 fatal2 and
9,400 non-fatal injuries3 occurred on those sites. The incident rate for nonfatal injuries on Washington construction sites in 2016 was 6.4 per 100

*

J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. I would like to thank all
the members of the Washington Law Review editorial staff. Without their camaraderie, dedication,
and incisive edits, this Comment would not have been possible. I have previously interned with the
Washington State Attorney General’s Office, Division of Labor and Industries, where I worked on
research surrounding WISHA violations. All opinions in this piece are my own and should not be
construed to reflect the opinion of anyone in that Division.
1. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ECONOMY AT GLANCE: WASHINGTON
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/SMS53000002000000001?amp%253bdata_tool=
XGtable&output_view=data&include_graphs=true [https://perma.cc/MR8R-W6KA].
2. WASH. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., 2016 WASHINGTON STATE CENSUS OF FATAL
OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES
(CFOI),
(2017),
http://www.lni.wa.gov/ClaimsIns/Files/DataStatistics/blsi/FATAL2016CFOIWA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3F3S-SAEJ].
3. WASH. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., INCIDENT RATES OF NONFATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES
AND
ILLNESSES
BY
SELECTED
INDUSTRIES
AND
CASE
TYPES
(2017),
http://www.lni.wa.gov/ClaimsIns/Files/DataStatistics/blsi/NONFATAL2016WASummary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4RH-8N2F].
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full-time workers as compared to 3.2 per 100 full-time workers across the
United States.4
Currently, the University of Washington is engaged in a $99 million,
two-year construction of a new building for the Burke Museum.5 The
Capital Projects Office of the University of Washington awarded the
construction contract to Skanska, which in turn acts as the general
contractor for the museum project.6 In this role, Skanska oversees the
construction and hires subcontractors to perform specialized work, such
as laying foundation and installing plumbing, wiring, roofing, etc.7 While
it may subcontract out tasks, Skanska is ultimately responsible for the
museum’s construction, including ensuring that all subcontracted work is
completed on time and within budget.8 Skanska, beyond fulfilling the
terms of its contract, must also ensure that it follows all relevant safety
laws during construction.9 In Washington, the Department of Labor and
Industries’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) polices
such compliance.10
Consider the following unfortunate possibility. Bob, a roofer, works
regularly for a roofing contractor in the Seattle area. The roofing
contractor secures a contract from Skanska to complete some roofing
work at the Burke Museum. While completing the work, on a typical rainy
Seattle day, Bob loses his footing on the slick roof and falls, breaking his
leg. After being taken to the hospital, the incident is reported as a
workplace injury to the Washington Department of Labor and Industries
(Department).11 That report triggers a DOSH investigation into the serious
injury Bob sustained.12 During the investigation, it comes to light that Bob
fell off the side of the roof where a safety railing had been removed 13 the
previous day by an unknown actor on the busy construction site. The
4. Id.
5. See Washington’s Oldest Museum Is Becoming Washington’s Newest Museum, BURKE MUSEUM
(2017), http://newburke.org/construction [https://perma.cc/44LK-7HA7].
6. Skanska Announced as the General Contractor/Construction Manager for New Burke Museum,
BURKE MUSEUM (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.burkemuseum.org/press/skanska-announced-generalcontractorconstruction-manager-new-burke-museum-0 [https://perma.cc/WW4H-VLTM].
7. See Contractor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 400 (10th ed. 2014).
8. Id.
9. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.060 (2016).
10. About WISHA, DOSH, and OSHA, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF LABOR AND INDUS.,
http://www.lni.wa.gov/SAFETY/TOPICS/ATOZ/ABOUT/DEFAULT.ASP#DOSH
[https://perma.cc/YN62-TUSH].
11. Pursuant to WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-27-031 (2016).
12. Id. § 296-900-12005.
13. In violation of WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-155-24609 (2016).
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DOSH compliance officer must now make a determination: who violated
the relevant safety regulation that led to Bob’s injury? Is the roofing
contractor that employs Bob responsible for the violation? Does ultimate
responsibility lie with Skanska because it controls the entire worksite? Or
is neither group liable, but rather the unknown employer—i.e. another
subcontractor working on the project—of whomever removed the railing
in the first place? Should the officer only cite one of the employers or
should all three (Skanska, Bob’s employer, and the employer of
whomever removed the railing) be cited because all three could have
prevented the injury?
This Comment argues that under the Washington Industrial Safety and
Health Act (WISHA), ultimate responsibility may rest with all three
actors. And, according to the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision
in Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc.,14 the Department must, at the bare minimum,
cite the general contractor.15
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I explores the history of
worker safety laws in Washington State and the adoption of WISHA.16
Part II tracks the development of general contractor liability for
subcontractor WISHA violations through Washington Court decisions.
Part III addresses the Department’s post-Stute policy decisions and
guidelines for citing general contractors for subcontractor WISHA
violations, with special emphasis on the current citation scheme. Part IV
examines two administrative decisions from the agency that hears
WISHA violation appeals and the agency’s attempts to grapple with both
the law and the Department’s citation policy. Finally, Part V argues that
the Department should change its current policy because it is not
supported by current Washington law, causes confusion before both the
administrative agency and courts, and harms Washington’s workers.
I.

WORKER SAFETY IN WASHINGTON: FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE TO COMPREHENSIVE
REGULATORY SCHEME

Part I offers a brief overview of Washington’s pre-1970 worker safety
history, the enactment of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (OSHA), and Washington’s adoption of its state-run worker
safety plan as allowed by the federal act. It then provides background on
the Department’s authority and duties under WISHA.

14. 114 Wash. 2d 454, 788 P.2d 545 (1990).
15. See generally id.
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17 (2016).
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The Enactment of the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act
of 1973

Like only twenty other states, Washington’s Constitution mandates
legislative protection of its workers.17 Specifically, the Washington
Constitution states, “[t]he legislature shall pass necessary laws for the
protection of persons working in mines, factories and other employments
dangerous to life or deleterious to health; and fix pains and penalties for
the enforcement of the same.”18 In the first ninety years after the
ratification of the Washington Constitution, the legislature passed
numerous worker safety laws in compliance with its constitutional
mandate.19 Those protections included the regulation of the work day,
worker safety record-keeping requirements, the creation of the Bureau of
Labor to perform workplace inspections, equipment and premises
safeguards, and the establishment of a workers compensation program.20
Many of these protections remain in force today.21
Beyond the State constitutional mandate, the Washington State
Legislature decided to opt into a more rigorous safety program than the
required federal system. In 1970, Congress created a federal program for
protecting worker safety and health22 by enacting OSHA.23 OSHA allows
states to create their own systems for protecting worker safety and health
so long as the individual state plan obtained certification from OSHA after
review and approval.24 As of 2017, Washington is one of twenty-two
jurisdictions25 that has an approved state plan.26 In 1973, the Washington
State Legislature enacted WISHA.27 WISHA acts as the state-run
counterpart to OSHA, allowing state control over occupational health and

17. EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 113–14 (2013).
18. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 35.
19. Alan S. Paja, The Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act: WISHA’s Twentieth
Anniversary, 1973–1993, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 259, 259–62 (1994) (discussing the state of
worker safety laws in Washington before the passage of WISHA).
20. Id. at 259–61.
21. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17 (workplace safety); WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010
(workers’ compensation); WASH ADMIN. CODE § 296-17-35204 (workers’ compensation).
22. See Paja, supra note 19, at 263.
23. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 651–678).
24. See Paja, supra note 19, at 264.
25. Twenty-one states and Puerto Rico.
26. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW § 3:10 (2018).
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17 (2016); see also Paja, supra note 19, at 259.
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safety, so long as such control meets or exceeds federal standards.28
WISHA begins with a statement of purpose declaring that it is in the
public interest to protect the health and safety of Washington’s workers:
The legislature finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising
out of conditions of employment impose a substantial burden
upon employers and employees . . . . Therefore, in the public
interest for the welfare of the people of the state of Washington
and in order to assure, insofar as may reasonably be possible, safe
and healthful working conditions for every man and woman
working in the state of Washington, the legislature . . . declares
its purpose by provisions of this chapter to create, maintain,
continue, and enhance the industrial safety and health program of
the state . . . .29
Scholars have noted that “[a]lthough the legislative history of WISHA
is not extensive, there is enough to indicate that the legislative intent in
passing WISHA was to strengthen and centralize the regulatory powers of
the state in the area of job site safety.”30 As per federal mandate, WISHA
requires the State’s worker safety program to equal or exceed OSHA
standards.31
B.

How the Department Enforces WISHA

The Department manages and develops the WISHA-mandated worker
safety program.32 WISHA establishes general safety principles and grants
the Department broad authority to develop regulations to ensure those
principles are met.33 Under this broad statutory authority, the Department
has promulgated a variety of worker safety regulations.34 WISHA, as part
of the general principles established in its statutory enactment, places a
“two-fold duty” on employers.35 WISHA requires that employers
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1902.42 (2018); see also Paja, supra note 19, at 265.
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.010.
30. Stephen L. Bulzomi & John L. Messina, Washington’s Industrial Safety Regulations: The
Trend Towards Greater Protection for Workers, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 315, 321 (1994).
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.010.
32. See id. § 49.17.040 (“The director shall make, adopt, modify and repeal rules and regulations
governing safety and health standards for conditions of employment . . . .”); Id. § 49.17.020(2) (“The
term ‘director’ means the director of the department of labor and industries, or his or her designated
representative.”); Paja, supra note 19, at 265 (“WISHA entrusts to Labor and Industries full
responsibility for occupational safety and health in the state.”).
33. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.040.
34. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 296-05-001–296-901-14032 (2018).
35. See Paja, supra note 19, at 265 (“WISHA establishes the two-fold duty of every employer not
only to comply with promulgated regulations but also to ‘furnish to each of his employees a place of
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(1) provide “a place of employment free from recognized hazards” and
(2) comply with all “rules, regulations, and orders” promulgated by the
Department.36 Thus, an employer is statutorily required to provide a safe
work place and also comply with all relevant safety regulations.
As part of its enforcement of WISHA, the Department, through DOSH,
conducts worksite inspections to determine compliance with safety
statutes and regulations.37 Violations are categorized as some combination
of the following terms: general, serious, willful, or repeat.38 A serious
violation is one that creates a “substantial probability that death or serious
physical harm could result” from the violation.39 A general violation is
one that has been “specifically determined not to be of a serious nature.”40
Willful and repeat violations are modifiers of serious or general violations
that exist when either of the necessary pre-conditions, willfulness or the
repetitive nature of the violation, is present.41
If DOSH finds a violation during a compliance inspection, it issues a
citation to the employer.42 The citation must be issued “with reasonable
promptness” and must “describe with particularity the nature of the
violation, including a reference to the provisions of the statute, standard,
rule, regulation, or order alleged to have been violated.”43 If DOSH issues
a citation, absent specific limitations,44 the Department may levy civil
penalties against the employer.45
Penalties for citations are levied based upon either a statutorily imposed
amount or, for serious violations, an assigned “gravity.”46 A citation’s
gravity is calculated by multiplying the severity of the violation by the
probability that the violation would result in an injury.47 Severity is rated
employment free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause serious injury or death
to his employees.’”).
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.060.
37. Paja, supra note 19, at 267–70.
38. WASH. REV. CODE. § 49.17.180.
39. Id. § 49.17.180(6). However, a serious violation cannot be issued if the “employer did not, and
could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the violation.” Id.
40. Id. § 49.17.180(3).
41. Id. § 49.17.180(1).
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.05.090(2) (2016).
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.120.
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.05.090(2)(a)–(d) (“The citation shall not assess a penalty if the
violations: (a) Are determined not be of a serious nature; (b) Have not been previously cited; (c) Are
not willful; and (d) Do not have a mandatory penalty under chapter 49.17 RCW.”).
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.180.
46. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-900-14010 (2017).
47. Id.
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on a three point scale.48 A severity of three signifies that a resultant injury
would likely result in death or permanent disability.49 A severity of one
signifies that an injury would not require hospitalization.50 Probability is
also rated on a three point scale.51 A three indicates a high probability the
injury would have occurred and a one indicates a low probability the
injury would have occurred as a result of the violation.52 The highest
possible gravity for a citation is a gravity of nine.53 However, if the
violation “could cause injury or illness to an employee but would not
result in serious physical harm,” the violation is categorized as a “general
violation” and does not result in a civil penalty for a first time offense.54
Although the Act mandates that the Department “shall” issue citations,
it also provides for three statutory exceptions to this requirement.55 First,
the Department may not issue a citation more than six months after the
“compliance inspection, investigation, or survey” reveals the violation.56
Second, a citation will not be issued if the Director prescribes procedures
for “notice in lieu of a citation with respect to de minimis violations.”57
And third, no citation will be issued if the violation was the result of
unpreventable employee misconduct.58 As the first two exceptions have
not been affected by the Washington State Supreme Court’s general
contractor jurisprudence, they are not explored further in this Comment.
This Comment focuses on the legal consequences of the standards applied
to the affirmative defense of unpreventable employee misconduct.
Unpreventable employee misconduct is a statutory defense to WISHA
violations.59 Under WISHA, unpreventable employee misconduct is an
affirmative defense.60 To assert the defense, the employer must show:
(i) [a] thorough safety program, including work rules, training,
and equipment designed to prevent the violation; (ii) [a]dequate
communication of these rules to employees; (iii) [s]teps to
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.17.120(2), (4), (5) (2016).
Id. § 49.17.120(4).
Id. § 49.17.120(2).
Id. § 49.17.120(5).
Id.
Potelco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 194 Wash. App. 428, 435, 377 P.3d 251, 255 (2016).
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discover and correct violations of its safety rules; and
(iv) [e]ffective enforcement of its safety program as written in
practice and not just in theory.61
The employer bears the burden to prove each element of the defense.62
“[F]urthermore, ‘the evidence must support the employer’s assertion that
the employees’ misconduct was an isolated occurrence and was not
foreseeable.’”63 Only if the employer can prove all the elements of the
defense will the reviewing body overturn the citation.64
When the Department issues a citation and a cited employer disagrees
with the decision, the party may appeal the citation.65 To appeal a citation,
the party must first notify the director of the Department of its intention
to appeal.66 After this notification, the director may reassume jurisdiction
of the matter and issue a corrective notice of redetermination or allow the
appeal to proceed directly to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals
(Board).67 The Board hears all appeals from citations issued for WISHA
violations.68 Decisions issued by the Board may be appealed to superior
court.69 The superior court reviews Board findings of fact under a
substantial evidence standard and the Board’s conclusions of law de
novo.70 Although review of the Board’s conclusions of law is de novo, the
courts give “substantial weight to [the Department’s] interpretation of
statutes and regulations within its area of expertise.”71 A Board finding
that the Department has established the existence of a violation is
reviewed on appeal under a substantial evidence standard.72

61. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.120(5)(a)).
62. Id. (citing Wash. Cedar & Supply Co. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. (Wash. Cedar I), 119 Wash.
App. 906, 911, 83 P.3d 1012, 1014 (2004)).
63. Id. (citing BD Roofing, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. App. 98, 111, 161 P.3d 387,
394 (2007)).
64. Id.
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.140 (2016).
66. Id. § 49.17.140(3).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 49.17.150.
70. Id. (“The findings of the board or hearing examiner where the board has denied a petition or
petitions for review with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive.”); Erection Co. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 160
Wash. App. 194, 201, 248 P.3 1085, 1089 (2011).
71. Wash. Cedar I, 119 Wash. App. 906, 913, 83 P.3d 1012, 1015 (2004).
72. J.E. Dunn Nw., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. App. 35, 45, 156 P.3d 250, 255
(2007).
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When a citation is appealed, the Department bears the burden of
proving the underlying violation.73 Washington courts have divided safety
regulations into two categories: general duty and specific duty.74 A
general duty regulation is a regulation that creates a “non-specific duty
that an employer take all reasonable steps to protect the safety of its
employees.”75 This general duty governs all employer safety obligations
unless a more specific standard applies.76 To prove a general duty
violation, the Department must show “the employer failed to render the
workplace free of (1) a hazard, which (2) was recognized, and (3) caused
or was likely to cause death or serious injury.”77 Further, the Department
must specify what steps the employer needed to take and prove that those
steps were “feasible.”78 In contrast, when the Department alleges a
violation of a specific standard it must establish only four elements:
(1) [T]he cited standard applies; (2) the requirements of the standard were
not met; (3) employees were exposed to, or had access to, the violative
condition; [and] (4) the employer knew or, through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, could have known of the violative condition.79
When citing under a specific standard, “it is not necessary to even prove
that a hazard exists, just that the specific standard was violated.”80 And
unlike a citation under the general duty standard, the specific standard is
presumed feasible and the employer bears the burden of proving
infeasibility.81 A violation of a specific standard may be cited as “serious”
with an additional showing that “‘there is a substantial probability that
death or serious physical harm could result’ from the violative
condition.”82 The Washington State Supreme Court has noted that the
“clear evidentiary differences” between actions brought under specific
and general duty standards create “increased difficulty” for the
73. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 263-12-115(2)(b) (2017); SuperValu, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.,
158 Wash. 2d 422, 433, 144 P.3d 1160, 1165 (2006).
74. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 111 Wash. App. 771, 779–80,
48 P.3d 324, 329–30 (2002).
75. Wash. Cedar & Supply Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. (Wash. Cedar II), 137 Wash. App.
592, 602, 154 P.3d 287, 292 (2007).
76. Id. at 602–03, 154 P.3d at 293.
77. SuperValu, Inc., 158 Wash. 2d at 433, 144 P.3d at 1165 (citing Kaiser Aluminum, 111 Wash.
App. at 780, 48 P.3d at 330).
78. Wash. Cedar II, 137 Wash. App. at 602, 154 P.3d at 292–93.
79. SuperValu, Inc., 158 Wash. 2d at 433, 144 P.3d at 1165.
80. Id. at 434, 144 P.3d at 1165.
81. Id.
82. J.E. Dunn Nw., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. App. 35, 44–45, 156 P.3d 250, 254
(2007) (quoting Wash. Cedar I, 119 Wash. App. 906, 914, 83 P.3d 1012, 1016 (2003)).
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Department in proving general duty violations.83 This increased difficulty
heightens the emphasis on the Department’s citation policy in ensuring
employers are properly policed for workplace safety violations. The
standards of proof required, as well as the availability of certain
affirmative defenses, depends on the status of the employer, the
regulations referenced, and the wording used in the citation.
II.

A HIGHER STANDARD: THE EVOLUTION OF GENERAL
CONTRACTOR LIABILITY

Part II examines the evolving jurisprudence of general contractor
liability from the pre-WISHA common law approach explained in Kelley
v. Howard S. Wright Construction, Co.84 through the most recent
interpretations of the requirements of WISHA.85 This Part pays particular
attention to the ramifications of the Stute decision, in which the
Washington State Supreme Court held that general contractors are per se
liable for the WISHA violations of their subcontractors.86
A.

The Washington State Supreme Court’s Pre-WISHA General
Contractor Jurisprudence

Prior to the enactment of WISHA, the common law governed
workplace safety liability. In 1978, five years after the enactment of
WISHA, the Washington State Supreme Court significantly expanded
general contractor liability in Kelley. Although the Washington State
Supreme Court announced its decision five years after the enactment of
WISHA, the alleged injuries occurred prior to the enactment of the statute
and thus provide a glimpse into the state of general contractor liability in
Washington prior to WISHA.87 In Kelley, the employee of a subcontractor
sued the general contractor for negligence after falling twenty-nine feet
onto a concrete floor.88 The employee’s claim against the general
contractor was predicated on the general contractor’s failure to provide a

83. SuperValu, Inc., 158 Wash. 2d at 434, 144 P.3d at 1165–66.
84. 90 Wash. 2d 323, 582 P.2d 500 (1978).
85. See, e.g., Afoa v. Port of Seattle (Afoa I), 176 Wash. 2d 460, 296 P.3d 800 (2013) (exploring
the evolution of general contractor liability in Washington).
86. Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 464, 788 P.2d 545, 550–51 (1990).
87. See Bulzomi & Messina, supra note 30, at 318–19; Gregory J. Duff, Comment, Job Site Safety
in Washington: Requiring Actual Control when Imposing Statutory Duties on Job Site Owners, 17 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 355, 360–67 (1994).
88. Kelley, 90 Wash. 2d at 327, 582 P.2d at 503.
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safety net in violation of an OSHA safety regulation.89 Under the common
law in Washington at the time, “one who engages an independent
contractor is not liable for injuries resulting from the contractor’s work.”90
However, an employer of an independent contractor could be liable if the
employer “retains control over some part of the work.”91 The employer
did not need to actually control the work of the contractor, but rather
needed only to have the right to exercise control.92
In finding for the employee, the Kelley Court expanded the common
law control doctrine, holding that a general contractor had per se control
over the worksite.93 In explaining its decision to expand the liability of
general contractors, the Court reasoned that such a rule would increase
overall safety:
Placing ultimate responsibility on the general contractor for job
safety in common work areas will . . . render it more likely that
the various subcontractors being supervised by the general
contractor will implement or that the general contractor will
himself implement the necessary precautions and provide the
necessary safety equipment . . . .94
However, Kelley relied in part on statutes that had been repealed and
replaced in the interim with WISHA. Therefore, shortly after Kelley, all
three divisions of the Washington Court of Appeals ruled that WISHA
severely restricted the potential liability of jobsite employers.95 All three
divisions “construed WISHA as limiting the tort rights” of workers
injured as a result of a violation by “an employer other than their own.”96
B.

Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc.: The Washington State Supreme Court
Rebuffs Attempts to Limit Liability Under WISHA

The confusion over the scope of general contractor liability remained
until 1990 when the Washington State Supreme Court reaffirmed its
ruling in Kelley and expanded general contractor liability further in Stute
89. Id.
90. Bulzomi & Messina, supra note 30, at 317.
91. Id. at 318.
92. Id.
93. Kelley, 90 Wash. 2d at 331, 582 P.2d at 505; Bulzomi & Messina, supra note 30, at 319.
94. Kelley, 90 Wash. 2d at 331, 582 P.2d at 505.
95. Straw v. Esteem Constr. Co., 45 Wash. App. 869, 728 P.2d 1052 (1986) (Division Three);
Bozung v. Condominium Builders, Inc., 42 Wash. App. 442, 711 P.2d 1090 (1985) (Division Two);
Ward v. Ceco Corp., 40 Wash. App. 619, 699 P.2d 814 (1985) (Division One); Bulmozi & Messina,
supra note 30, at 324.
96. Bulmozi & Messina, supra note 30, at 324.
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v. P.B.M.C., Inc.97 In Stute, the plaintiff, a roofing subcontractor, fell off
a rain-slick roof while working without fall-protection gear or the benefit
of scaffolding to break his fall.98 At the time of the fall, the general
contractor knew that “employees of the subcontractor were working on
the roof without safety devices.”99 After the accident, the plaintiff brought
suit against the general contractor alleging it owed him a “duty to provide
necessary safety devices at the job site.”100 The Stute Court first examined
the decisions reached by the three divisions of the Washington Court of
Appeals and rejected those decisions as conflicting with binding
precedent.101
After holding that a subcontractor employee is of the “class of persons”
protected by WISHA, the Court turned to P.B.M.C.’s argument that it was
not liable because it did not “control the work of the subcontractor.”102
The Court dismissed the argument holding that general contractors bear
primary responsibility for jobsite safety:
Inasmuch as both the general contractor and subcontractor come
within the statutory definition of employer, the primary employer,
the general contractor, has, as a matter of policy, the duty to
comply with or ensure compliance with WISHA and its
regulations. A general contractor’s supervisory authority places
the general in the best position to ensure compliance with safety
regulations. For this reason, the prime responsibility for safety of
all workers should rest on the general contractor.103
The Stute Court emphatically clarified the point later in the opinion,
“[a] general contractor’s supervisory authority is per se control over the
workplace, and the duty [to comply with WISHA] is placed upon the
general contractor as a matter of law.”104 The Stute Court reaffirmed its
pre-WISHA holding in Kelley stating that the policy reasons behind
extending general contractor liability had not changed.105 The Court

97. Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 788 P.2d 545 (1990).
98. Id. at 456, 788 P.2d at 546.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 458–61, 788 P.2d at 547–49 (stating that the Court of Appeals decisions “conflict with
this court’s holdings that the WISHA regulations apply to employees of independent contractors as
well as direct employees of an employer. Employers must comply with the WISHA regulations to
protect not only their direct employees but all employees on the job site”).
102. Id. at 460, 788 P.2d at 548.
103. Id. at 463, 788 P.2d at 550.
104. Id. at 464, 788 P.2d at 550–51 (emphasis added).
105. Id.
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further clarified the importance of its decision, tying its reasoning to the
underlying statutory decree of WISHA.106 The Court stated that “to further
the purpose of WISHA to assure safe and healthful working conditions
for every person working in Washington, RCW 49.17.010, we hold the
general contractor should bear the primary responsibility for compliance
with safety regulations because the general contractor’s innate
supervisory authority constitutes sufficient control over the
workplace.”107
In Stute, the Washington State Supreme Court diverged from the
reasoning in Kelley by viewing a general contractor’s liability, not as
based in the common law doctrine of control, but as a liability imposed
by a statutory duty.108 RCW 49.17.060(2) supplies the statutory authority
for this duty.109 While RCW 49.17.060(1) “imposes a general duty on
employers to protect only the employer’s own employees from recognized
hazards not covered by specific safety regulations[,]” RCW 49.17.060(2)
“imposes a specific duty to comply with WISHA regulations.”110 The
Washington State Supreme Court reaffirmed prior case law111 that held
that when an employer fails to follow a specific WISHA regulation, “all
employees working on the premises are members of the protected
class.”112 Through its decision in Stute, the Washington State Supreme
Court increased the protection of workers in Washington by imposing a
statutory duty on both subcontractors and general contractors to comply
with safety regulations.113 This increased protection conforms with the
legislative intent behind WISHA.114 The Legislature’s two main concerns
in enacting WISHA were to promote worker safety and to promote

106. Id. at 464, 788 P.2d at 550.
107. Id.
108. See Bulzomi & Messina, supra note 30, at 327 (“Whereas the Kelley court saw a general
contractor’s innate supervisory authority as per se control sufficient to satisfy the control test and
impose the common law duty as a matter of law, Stute viewed this innate supervisory authority as a
policy justification to impose the statutory duty as a matter of law.”).
109. See Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 458, 788 P.2d at 547 (“Thus, the specific duty clause of
RCW 49.17.060(2), requiring employers to comply with applicable WISHA regulations, applies to
employees of subcontractors.”).
110. Id. at 457, 788 P.2d at 547.
111. See Adkins v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 110 Wash. 2d 128, 153, 750 P.2d 1257, 1271 (1988).
112. Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 457, 788 P.2d at 547 (citing Adkins, 110 Wash. 2d at 153, 750 P.2d at
1271).
113. See Bulzomi & Messina, supra note 30, at 327–28 (“WISHA was not to be viewed as a step
backwards in the protection of workers, but as a step forward.”).
114. See id. at 335.
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efficiency in the administration of worker safety law.115 Stute is in direct
concert with these aims as it promotes “certainty under the innate
supervisory authority approach” and ensures compliance with WISHA by
imposing civil liability on both general and subcontractors.116
In their 1994 article discussing the impact and potential reach of Stute,
Stephen Bulzomi and John Messina argue that Stute liability should be
extended to jobsite owners and developers to further promote the purpose
of WISHA.117 They contend that “[u]nder the Stute approach, general
contractors and owners know they are responsible for WISHA
compliance, and subcontractors know they are responsible in their work
area. The parties can figure their potential liability and prepare for it. This
will save employers from unexpected liabilities.”118 Further, the scholars
posit that restricting Stute to only general contractors would allow jobsite
owners and developers to shrug off responsibility over areas they control
by “intentionally abdicating control over safety.”119
C.

After Stute, Continued Expansion of Jobsite Liability Offered More
Potential Liable Parties but Less Clear Liability

During the three decades since Stute, Washington courts have
continued to expand the potential scope of liability at the center of the
decision. Contrary to the position advocated by Bulzomi and Messina, the
Washington State Supreme Court refused to extend per se liability to
jobsite owners.120 However, courts have forged a middle ground
incorporating the common law “control” doctrine to find liability for
jobsite owners121 and upper-tier subcontractors.122
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 340–41.
118. Id. at 340.
119. Id. at 341 (“Such apathy is not what the legislature sought when it enacted WISHA. Owners
should be encouraged to become more, not less, involved in the safety of the jobs they initiate.”).
120. Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 147 Wash. 2d 114, 127, 52 P.3d 472, 478 (2002) (“[A]s a
jobsite owner, Space Needle is not similar enough to a general contractor to justify imposing the same
nondelegable duty of care to ensure WISHA compliant work conditions.”).
121. See, e.g., Afoa I, 176 Wash. 2d 460, 472, 296 P.3d 800, 807 (2013) (“[I]t is settled law that
jobsite owners have a specific duty to comply with WISHA regulations if they retain control over the
manner and instrumentalities of work being done on the jobsite. Further, this duty extends to all
workers on the jobsite that may be harmed by WISHA violations.”); Kinney v. Space Needle Corp.,
121 Wash. App. 242, 248, 85 P.3d 918, 921 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (“While jobsite owners are not
per se liable under the statutory requirements of RCW 49.17 they may retain a similar degree of
authority to control jobsite work conditions and subject themselves to WISHA regulations.”).
122. See, e.g., Husfloen v. MTA Constr., Inc., 58 Wash. App. 686, 689–90, 794 P.2d 859, 861
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (“MTA maintains that Stute is distinguishable because it involved two rather
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Washington courts have often looked to OSHA case law to aid in
interpreting Washington worker safety laws.123 In 2005, the Washington
Court of Appeals adopted the “multi-employer worksite” doctrine,
established in federal OSHA case law.124 Under the doctrine, an employer
at a multi-employer worksite is liable for a violation if the employer was
a “creating, exposing, correcting, or controlling employer” of the violative
hazard.125 In Martinez Melgoza & Associates Inc. v. Department of Labor
& Industries,126 the Department issued a citation to an asbestos abatement
consulting firm for violating seven WISHA regulations relating to unsafe
asbestos work practices.127 At the court of appeals, the firm contended
that, as a consultant, it could not be “subject to penalties for WISHA
violations.”128 The firm argued that it was not sufficiently similar to a
general contractor because it “did not design the project, hire or fire
contractors, or negotiate change orders.”129 The court discussed the
“multi-employer worksite” doctrine applied in federal OSHA cases, and
adopted the doctrine to hold that the firm, as the “controlling employer,”
was liable for the WISHA violations.130
1.

The Federal Multi-Employer Worksite Doctrine Has Evolved
Along Similar but Distinct Lines from Washington State Jobsite
Liability Jurisprudence

The Federal “Multi-Employer Worksite” doctrine arises from a U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) OSHA directive outlining the DOL’s citation
policy at multi-employer worksites.131 The directive is an agency policy
than three levels of employers as is the case here. This factual distinction is without consequence . . . .
MTA did not avoid owing a duty to Husfloen merely because it was a subcontractor, not the general
contractor of the project.”).
123. See, e.g., Adkins v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 110 Wash. 2d 128, 147, 750 P.2d 1257, 1268
(1988) (“In deciding what constitutes the exposure to a hazard which will trigger application of the
regulations, we will consider decisions construing the federal counterpart to WISHA, OSHA, and
federal decisions involving machine guarding regulations.”).
124. Martinez Melgoza & Associates, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 125 Wash. App. 843, 853,
106 P.3d 776, 781–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
125. Id. at 850, 106 P.3d at 780.
126. 125 Wash. App. 843, 106 P.3d 776 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
127. Id. at 846, 106 P.3d at 778.
128. Id. at 844–45, 106 P.3d at 777.
129. Id. at 853, 106 P.3d at 781.
130. Id. at 851–53, 106 P.3d at 780–82 (“We conclude that substantial evidence demonstrates that
MMA, in actual practice, exercised sufficient control over the worksite so as to be liable for the
WISHA citations under the multi-employer worksite doctrine.”).
131. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OSHA INSTRUCTION:
MULTI-EMPLOYER CITATION POLICY, CPL 02-00-124 (Dec. 10, 1999) [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL
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statement and did not go through notice and comment rulemaking
procedures.132 However, it has been accepted by the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission, the administrative body that hears
OSHA disputes, as well as several U.S. Courts of Appeals.133 The
directive states OSHA policy for citing employers at multi-employer
worksites and explains the four categories of employers at such sites that
will be liable for violations.134 Under the directive, an employer may be
cited for a violation if the employer was the “creating, exposing,
correcting, or controlling employer” of the hazard that led to the
violation.135 A “creating” employer is defined as “[t]he employer that
caused a hazardous condition that violates an OSHA standard.”136 An
“exposing” employer is one “whose own employees are exposed to the
hazard.”137 A “correcting” employer is “[a]n employer who is engaged in
a common undertaking, on the same worksite, as the exposing employer
and is responsible for correcting a hazard.”138 And finally, a “controlling”
employer is “[a]n employer who has general supervisory authority over
the worksite, including the power to correct safety and health violations
itself or require others to correct them.”139
Applying the OSHA directive, the Eighth Circuit found in Marshall v.
Knutson Construction Co.140 that a general contractor may be a controlling
employer. The Eighth Circuit held that because general contractors
“normally have the responsibility and the means to assure that other
contractors fulfill their obligations with respect to employee safety where
those obligations affect the construction worksite,” a general contractor
could be a controlling employer.141 This duty is not “limited to the
protection of its own employees . . . but extends to the protection of all

SAFETY
&
HEALTH
ADMIN.],
https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_id=2024&p_table=DIRECTIVES
[https://perma.cc/5425-6DYK].
132. See Jon M. Philipson, Owner Beware: OSHA’s Impact on Tort Litigation by Independent
Contractors’ Injured Employees Against Business Premises Owners, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987, 994
(2012).
133. Id.
134. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 131.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 566 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
141. Id. at 599.
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employees engaged at the worksite.”142 However, the Eighth Circuit
further stated that the standard set by the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission in determining general contractor OSHA liability
was whether “[the general contractor] could reasonably have been
expected to prevent or abate by reason of its supervisory capacity.”143 This
lesser duty of a controlling employer is supported by the OSHA directive
itself, which states that “the extent of the measures that a controlling
employer must take to satisfy its duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent and detect violations is less than what is required of an employer
with respect to protecting its own employees.”144
2.

The Washington State Supreme Court Has Expressly Adopted the
Multi-Employer Worksite Doctrine as a Distinct Form of Liability

In 2013, the Washington State Supreme Court approved the adoption
of the federal multi-employer worksite doctrine.145 However, in approving
the use of the doctrine to hold jobsite owners and other employers liable
for WISHA violations, the Court distinguished “multi-employer
worksite” liability from general contractor Stute liability.146 The Court
affirmed its previous ruling in Kamla v. Space Needle Corp.,147 stating,
“we held that although general contractors and similar employers always
have a duty to comply with WISHA regulations, the person or entity that
owns the jobsite is not per se liable for WISHA violations.”148 The Court
then went on to affirm that while jobsite owners do not have the same per
se liability as general contractors, jobsite owners “have a duty to comply
with WISHA only if they retain control over the manner in which
contractors complete their work.”149 In reaffirming the per se liability of
general contractors and the potential liability for WISHA violations of
other employers, the Court once again based its holding on the policy
underlying the enactment of WISHA: the protection of Washington’s
workers.150
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 131.
145. Afoa I, 176 Wash. 2d 460, 472, 296 P.3d 800, 807 (2013).
146. Id. at 471–72, 296 P.3d at 806–07.
147. 147 Wash. 2d 114, 52 P.3d 472 (2002).
148. Afoa I, 176 Wash. 2d at 472, 296 P.3d at 807.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 473, 296 P.3d at 808 (“We reaffirm Goucher and Stute and hold that WISHA’s specific
duty does not require a direct employment relationship. To read the statute in any other way would
contravene both federal law and WISHA’s clearly articulated policy of protecting workplace safety.”).
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Washington State Supreme Court Further Muddies the Waters
Between Multi-Employer Worksite Doctrine and Stute Liability

Recently, in July 2018, the Washington State Supreme Court issued a
new opinion in Afoa v. Port of Seattle.151 Although the issue before the
Court was the imposition of joint and several liability against the
defendant,152 the opinion contains language that may further muddy the
distinction between tort and WISHA liability. In the case, the jury had
“apportioned fault” between the plaintiff, the Port of Seattle, and several
airlines, and the plaintiff argued that the Port was vicariously liable for
the airlines portion of the damages award.153
In discussing whether the Port was jointly and severally liable for the
actions of the airlines, the majority stated that “[u]nder some
circumstances, jobsite owners may have a duty of care analogous to that
of an employer or general contractor. A jobsite owner or general
contractor will have this duty only if it maintains a sufficient degree of
control over the work.”154
It is possible that this statement, that both jobsite owners’ and general
contractors’ duties are tied to the amount of control retained, could impact
the general contractor WISHA liability described in Stute.155 But this
statement comes in a discussion of vicarious tort liability potentially
imposed on a jobsite owner, rather than in a discussion of general
contractor or jobsite owner liability for WISHA violations (the majority
notably never references Stute).156 While the effects of this decision on
general contractor tort liability are beyond the scope of this Comment, it
is unlikely that the decision displaced the rule announced in Stute that
general contractors are per se liable for the WISHA violations of their
subcontractors.157

151. Afoa v. Port of Seattle (Afoa II), No. 94525-0 (Wash. July 19, 2018).
152. Id., slip op. at 1.
153. Id.
154. Id., slip op. at 9 (internal citations omitted).
155. Id., slip op. at -2- (Stephens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s vicarious liability ruling
will “dramatically change the law and to eviscerate the protections for workers at multiemployer work
sites recognized under the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act”).
156. Id., slip op. at 9–13 (majority opinion) (discussing the nondelegable duty to provide a safe
workplace in relation to Washington’s tort liability statutory scheme).
157. See id., slip op. at -12- (Stephens, J., dissenting) (“[A] violation of WISHA by a subcontractor
is not only chargeable to the subcontractor but also chargeable to a general contractor—‘the primary
employer,’ whose supervisory authority puts it ‘in the best position to ensure compliance with safety
regulations.’” (citing Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 463, 788 P.2d 545, 550 (1990);
Millican v. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc., 177 Wash. App. 881, 893, 313 P.3d 1215, 1221 (Wash. Ct. App.
2013))).
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III. WISHA REGIONAL DIRECTIVE 27.00: THE DEPARTMENT’S
POST-STUTE CITATION POLICY AND ITS DETRIMENTAL
EFFECT ON CITATION APPEALS
Part III focuses on the actual enforcement of WISHA. It discusses the
Department’s guidance document regarding general contractor liability,
which is provided to both DOSH compliance officers charged with issuing
citations and employers who may face liability. This Part discusses the
legal and policy bases for the Department’s guidance. Next, this Part
explores the effect of that guidance on the Board and how decisions made
by DOSH compliance officers at the site of an accident can severely
impact the enforceability of a given citation against a liable employer.
A.

The Regional Directive Provides a Clear View of the Law but Fails
to Create a Policy to Match

As discussed above, the Department conducts workplace inspections to
determine WISHA compliance and issues citations for WISHA
violations.158 To ensure that the public understands laws and regulations
that may affect them, the Legislature has encouraged agencies, such as the
Department, to issue policy statements outlining the agency’s
interpretation of those laws and its enforcement policies.159 These policy
statements are non-binding and “advisory only.”160 In accordance with
this statutory encouragement, the Department has issued a number of
policy statements, which it titles WISHA Regional Directives (WRD).161
These WRDs represent the Department’s current policy on a given subject
and serve to inform Department staff, and those private citizens who may
be affected, of that policy.162 A WRD is not an agency rule and thus does
not have the effect of law.163 In response to Stute, the Department

158. Paja, supra note 19.
159. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.230 (2016).
160. Id.
161. Rule Interpretations & Enforcement Policies, WASH. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS.,
https://www.lni.wa.gov/Safety/Rules/Policies/ByName/default.asp?T=WRD&SB=
[https://perma.cc/245S-55AD].
162. See, e.g., WASH. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., DOSH DIRECTIVE 6.55: CONE-SETTING
REQUIREMENTS (July 20, 2012), https://www.lni.wa.gov/Safety/Rules/Policies/PDFs/WRD655.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3VYR-5RW4] (explaining the Department’s stance on the correct way to set safety
cones).
163. J.E. Dunn Nw., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. App. 35, 52–53, 156 P.3d 250,
258 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that WRDs are policy statements that are advisory only and do
not have the effect of law).
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published WRD 27.00 outlining its policies towards citing general
contractors for WISHA violations of subcontractors.164
Most recently, the Department updated the WRD on November 30,
2016, to incorporate the effects of the Washington State Supreme Court’s
decisions in Afoa and Martinez Melgoza.165 The “Directive establishes
guidelines for DOSH compliance and consultation staff when assessing
an upper-tier contractor’s compliance with [WISHA] as it applies to
lower-tier contractor or its employees.”166 The Directive states that it
represents “compliance policy” and provides the Department’s
“interpretation of appropriate application” of WISHA in situations
involving potential general contractor liability for subcontractor WISHA
violations.167 Further, the Department states that “the intent of this
Directive is to reflect the current state of the law as accurately as
possible.”168
In laying out the foundation for the Department’s enforcement policy,
WRD 27.00 accurately explains the current state of the law.169 However,
WRD 27.00 then states that “[t]he Department interprets these statements
from the Washington Supreme Court to mean that if there is a serious
violation by a lower-tier contractor, a parallel violation to an upper-tier
contractor may be appropriate.”170 Further, WRD 27.00 directs
compliance officers to cite a general contractor under a different
regulation than the regulation violated by the underlying behavior or
hazard.171 It directs compliance officers to cite general contractors for a
164. DIV. OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, WASH. DEP’T OF LABOR AND INDUS., DOSH
DIRECTIVE 27.00: GENERAL OR UPPER-TIER CONTRACTOR (STUTE) RESPONSIBILITY (Nov. 30, 2016)
[hereinafter
WISHA
REGIONAL
DIRECTIVE
27.00],
http://www.lni.wa.gov/Safety/Rules/Policies/PDFs/WRD2700.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7VK-GSML].
165. Id. at ¶ I.
166. Id.
167. Id. at ¶ II.
168. Id. at ¶ III.
169. Id. at ¶ IV(B). (“The Washington Supreme Court has said that the liability of a general
contractor to employees on the worksite is ‘per se’ liability. Washington courts have explained that
general contractors have a non-delegable, specific duty to ensure compliance with all applicable
WISHA regulations for ‘every employee on the jobsite,’ not just its own employees. Thus, a general
contractor’s duty to protect workers on the jobsite extends to ‘any employee who may be harmed by
the employer’s violation of the safety rules.’ As our Supreme Court explained, ‘[t]he Stute court
imposed the per se liability as a matter of policy: “to further the purposes of WISHA to assure safe
and healthful working conditions for every person working in Washington.”’” (citations omitted)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at ¶ VI(B). (“The department has determined as a matter of enforcement discretion that
parallel violations will not necessarily be issued to general or upper-tier subcontractors for every
violation cited against one or more subcontractors. In order to distinguish upper-tier contractor
violations from violations involving the contractor’s own employees, compliance staff should
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violation of WAC 296-155-100(1)(a)172 which states, “[i]t is the
responsibility of management to establish, supervise, and enforce, in a
manner which is effective in practice: (a) A safe and healthful working
environment.”173 Finally, it directs DOSH compliance officers to refrain
from issuing a citation to the general or upper-tier contractor if it “appears
that the lower-tier contractor will be able to successfully assert an
affirmative defense such as unpreventable employee misconduct.”174
B.

The Negative Effect of WRD 27.00 on Upholding Citations on
Appeal

WRD 27.00 has caused significant issues for both the Board and
appellate courts in determining whether to uphold WISHA violation
citations. The mechanics of a WISHA appeal and the standards of review
employed by appellate courts make citations based on inaccurate
understandings of the law difficult to both parse and ultimately enforce.
Appeals of WISHA citations are heard before the Board of Industrial
Insurance Appeals.175 A statute mandates that the Board publish opinions
that it defines as “Significant Decisions.”176 Significant decisions are
those that the Board “considers to have an analysis or decision of
substantial importance to the board in carrying out its duties.”177 The
Board has published two “Significant Decisions” on Stute liability that
also address the Department’s Stute guidance documents.178 In 1998, the
Board designated its decision in In re Exxel Pacific, Inc.179 as
significant.180 At issue in that case was a department citation under
WAC 296-155-100(1)(a).181 A compliance officer observed two
subcontractor employees of Exxel Pacific loading materials onto a
sixteen-foot roof without tying off their safety lanyards to available
normally use WAC 296-155-100(1)(a).”).
172. Id.
173. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-155-100(1)(a) (2016).
174. WISHA REGIONAL DIRECTIVE 27.00, supra note 164, at ¶ VI(A).
175. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 263-12-010(3) (2017) (“The jurisdiction of the board extends
to . . . [a]ppeals arising under the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act.”).
176. Id. § 263-12-195(1).
177. Id.
178. In re Mediterranean Pac. Corp., BIIA Dec., No. 06 W0162 (June 28, 2007); In re Exxel Pac.,
Inc., BIIA Dec., No. 96 W182 (July 6, 1998).
179. Exxel Pac., BIIA Dec., No. 96 W182.
180. Significant
Decisions
Case
Name
Index,
B D.
INDUS.
INS.
APP.,
http://www.biia.wa.gov/SDNameIndex.html#e [https://perma.cc/ZXA3-RRFR].
181. Exxel Pac., BIIA Dec., No. 96 W182, at *3.
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anchor points as required by applicable WISHA regulations.182 Rather
than citing the general contractor for a violation under the applicable
regulation for failing to tie-off, Exxel Pacific was cited, per department
policy, for failing to provide a “safe and healthful working
environment.”183
In overturning the citation and concluding that Exxel Pacific had not
violated the provisions of WAC 296-155-100(1)(a), the Board clarified its
position on what the Department must show to successfully prove a
violation of that WAC.184 First, the Board stated that proof of a
subcontractor’s violation does not “constitute sufficient proof” that the
general contractor’s responsibility was not met under the WAC.185 Next,
the Board acknowledged that the WAC’s use of the language “effective
in practice” may cause confusion regarding whether the burden of proof
lies with the Department or with the employer in establishing the
effectiveness of the employer’s safety program. 186 The Board expressly
declined to decide who should bear that burden in Stute cases, only noting
that “the Department generally bears the initial burden of proof that the
violation occurred” and that the employer bears the burden of proving the
elements of the statutory defense of “unpreventable employee
misconduct.”187 Ultimately, the Board decided that the evidence of the
underlying violation was insufficient to prove that Exxel Pacific’s safety
program was ineffective and thus overturned the Department’s citation.188
The Board found that “Exxel met its primary responsibility for
compliance with safety regulations . . . in that it established, supervised
and enforced, in a manner that was effective in practice, a safe and
healthful working environment, in a manner consistent with its role as
general contractor.”189
In 2007, the Court of Appeals addressed the confusion surrounding the
apparently shifting burdens of proof by eliminating the unpreventable
182. Id. at *2.
183. See id. at *3.
184. Id. at *6–11.
185. Id. at *8.
186. Id. at *12. (“Once the Department establishes its prima facie case, in a non-Stute case, the
burden then shifts to the employer to establish all four elements of the affirmative defense of
unpreventable employee misconduct. We must, therefore, recognize that use of the term ‘effective in
practice,’ as a criteria for deciding Stute cases, could lead to confusion regarding whether the
Department or the general contractor bears the initial burden of showing whether or not the general
contractor’s safety program should be considered effective in practice.” (citation omitted)).
187. Id. at *13.
188. Id. at *29.
189. Id.
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employee misconduct defense in Stute citation cases.190 In J.E. Dunn
Northwest, Inc. v. Department of Labor and Industries,191 the Court of
Appeals foreclosed the availability of the unpreventable employee
misconduct affirmative defense in cases of WAC 296-155-100(1)
violations under Stute.192 The court founded its decision in the two-fold,
general versus specific, duty created by WISHA.193 Stute liability only
exists under the specific duty clause of RCW 49.17.060, and the
unpreventable employee misconduct statute “is a general provision of
WISHA, not a regulation promulgated pursuant thereto.”194 Because of
this distinction, the court determined that the statute could not be
interpreted to “give rise to duties of general contractors in regard to
oversight of employees of subcontractors.”195 Therefore, when the
Department cites a general contractor under WAC 296-155-100(1), the
Department bears the burden of proving that “the requirements of the
regulation were not met.”196
Then, immediately following the decision in J.E. Dunn, the Board
issued a significant decision explaining its understanding of the changes
established by the Court of Appeals’s decision in In re Mediterranean
Pacific Corp.197 In this case, the Board confronted the issue of how to
define whether an employer “was actually engaged as a general
contractor.”198 During the construction of a home, the employee of a
subcontractor was exposed to a “fall hazard of 35 feet 6 inches” without
the use of any fall protection.199 The Board acknowledged that the burden
of proof lay with the Department to establish a violation of WAC 296155-100(1)(a).200 The Board held that the Department could, and in the
present case did, establish its burden by presenting “evidence of violations
190. J.E. Dunn Nw., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. App. 35, 156 P.3d 250 (2007).
191. 139 Wash. App. 35, 156 P.3d 250 (2007).
192. Id. at 50, 156 P.3d at 257.
193. Id. at 48, 156 P.3d at 256.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 50, 156 P.3d at 257 (“The establishment, supervision and enforcement of . . . an accident
prevention program, are requirements of WAC 296-155-100(1). Accordingly, a showing that such
requirements are not met is an element of violations alleged . . . the burden of proving which must be
borne by the Department.”).
197. In re Mediterranean Pac. Corp., BIIA Dec., No. 06 W0162, at *2 (June 28, 2007) (“We have
granted review to clearly set forth our finding that the Department has met the requirements set forth
in J.E. Dunn Northwest . . . .”).
198. Id.
199. Id. at *3.
200. Id. at *2.
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of specific safety standards at the worksite.”201 The Board found that
“[t]he number, seriousness, and the general nature of the hazards that [the
Compliance Officer] observed at the work site clearly demonstrate that
Mediterranean Pacific Corp. did not take workplace safety seriously.”202
However, this may have been sufficient simply because “Mediterranean
Pacific Corp.[ ] offered no evidence to show that it had established,
supervised, and enforced a safe and healthful working environment which
was effective in practice.”203 In fact, the employer did not respond to the
Department’s discovery request when challenging the citation.204 Notably,
the Board labeled its decision a finding of fact, rather than a conclusion
of law, when it determined that Mediterranean Pacific Corp. acted as a
general contractor.205
The unreported opinion in Department of Labor & Industries v.
Howard S. Wright Constructors LP206 provides a troubling example of the
current effect of WRD 27.00 because the Court of Appeals required the
Department to prove extra elements beyond the underlying citation
violation. The court confronted a challenge to a department citation
stating, “[a]s the controlling contractor, the employer did not establish,
supervise, and enforce, in a manner which was effective in practice a safe
and healthful working environment by allowing 2 employees of its
subcontractor . . . to be subjected to hazards in violation of the
Washington Administrative Code . . . .”207 The Department contended
that Howard S. Wright Constructors, the general contractor, violated
WAC 296-155-100(1)(a) or “in the alternative” was responsible for the
subcontractor’s employees’ violations of the underlying specific safety
standards.208 On appeal, the employer argued that it did not “owe a duty
to provide a safe and healthful working environment for the
subcontractor’s employees.”209 The court held that general contractors
owe a “nondelegable specific duty to ensure WISHA compliance for the
protection of all employees on the jobsite.”210 The court determined that
the Department had established a prima facie case of a serious violation
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at *0.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
195 Wash. App. 1005, No. 73843-3-I, 2016 WL 3919704 (Wash. Ct. App. July 18, 2016).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.
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of WAC 296-155-100(1)(a) “because the Department demonstrated that
Wright failed to provide fall protection to the subcontractor’s employees
on the surface here at issue, the Department met its burden of
demonstrating Wright’s failure to provide a safe and healthful working
environment.”211 Thus, even though the court upheld the Department’s
citation, it still required the Department to both prove the violation of
WAC 296-155-100(1)(a) as well as the underlying subcontractor
violations.
IV. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CHANGE ITS POLICY TO
REFLECT CASE LAW AND PROTECT WORKER SAFETY
A.

The Current Department Policy Is Inconsistent with the
Washington State Supreme Court’s Case Law

This section argues that the Department’s policy of citing general
contractors under WAC 296-155-100(1)(a) is inconsistent with the
Washington State Supreme Court’s ruling in Stute and its progeny. The
Washington State Supreme Court has consistently held that general
contractor liability is per se liability.212 In determining the nature of
general contractor liability, the Court distinguished between the specific
and general requirements of WISHA. The Court held that general
contractors are not liable for violations of the general requirements of
WISHA but rather only for specific violations of regulations promulgated
under WISHA.213 By citing general contractors under WAC 296-155100(1)(a), the Department has circumvented this distinction by alleging
violations based on failure to provide a “safe and healthful working
environment”214 rather than the underlying violation observed by the
compliance officer. As suggested by Bulzomi and Messina,215 the Court’s
imposition of a statutory duty to comply with relevant safety regulations
on both general and subcontractors conformed with the legislative intent
behind WISHA.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Afoa I, 176 Wash. 2d 460, 471–72, 296 P.3d 800, 806–07 (2013) (reaffirming the
standard set by Stute and its progeny by noting that “general contractors and similar employers always
have a duty to comply with WISHA regulations . . .”). But see Afoa II, No. 94525-0, slip op. at 9
(Wash. July 19, 2018) (“Under some circumstances, jobsite owners may have a duty of care analogous
to that of an employer or general contractor. A jobsite owner or general contractor will have this duty
only if it maintains a sufficient degree of control over the work.” (citations omitted)).
213. Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 457, 788 P.2d 545, 547 (1990).
214. WASH. ADMIN. CODE. § 295-155-100 (2016).
215. See Bulzomi & Messina, supra note 30, at 334.
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However, the Department’s citing decision has created a double-layer
burden on the Department to prove violations against general contractors.
To prove a citation, the Department must first prove that the underlying
violation (e.g., inadequate fall protection, un-shored excavation, or
inadequate protective equipment) occurred and that a subcontractor
employee was exposed to the violation, and second, that this violation
amounted to a failure on the part of the general contractor to provide a
“safe and healthful working environment.”216 As the Washington State
Supreme Court noted in SuperValu, Inc.,217 the Department bears a much
higher evidentiary burden when citing a general duty violation, which
leads to “increased difficulty” in successfully upholding citations.218
The Department’s double layer burden of proof is contrary to the
Court’s Stute ruling that general contractors “bear the primary
responsibility for compliance with safety regulations because the general
contractor’s innate supervisory authority constitutes sufficient control
over the workplace.”219 If the Department must prove the underlying
violation and that the violation met a secondary standard, that burden does
not place “primary responsibility” on general contractors, but rather
ancillary or secondary responsibility.
This problem is further compounded by the unavailability of the
statutory unpreventable employee misconduct defense in cases involving
Stute liability. In a typical WISHA suit, an employer may assert, and bears
the burden of proving, the defense.220 However, after the Court of Appeals
decision in J.E. Dunn, an employer cannot raise the defense for WISHA
violations based on Stute liability.221 Rather than allowing a general
contractor to carry the burden to prove this affirmative defense as a
general contractor in relation to its subcontractor’s employees, the Court
of Appeals has foreclosed access to the defense in these situations. As an
apparent result of this foreclosure, the Department has preserved the
defense within its enforcement discretion by directing its compliance
officers to refrain from issuing citations in situations where it appears to
the officer that the subcontractor would likely be able to successfully

216. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-155-100(1)(a).
217. 158 Wash. 2d 422, 144 P.3d 1160 (2006).
218. SuperValu, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 158 Wash. 2d 422, 434, 144 P.3d 1160, 1166
(2006).
219. Stute, 114 Wash. 2d at 464, 144 P.3d at 550.
220. See Potelco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 194 Wash. App. 428, 435, 377 P.3d 251, 255
(2016).
221. See J.E. Dunn Nw., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash. App. 35, 156 P.3d 250 (2007).
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assert the defense against its own employee.222 This enforcement decision,
coupled with the Department’s decision to cite general contractors for
violations of WAC 296-155-100(a), has shifted the burden of proof
squarely from the employers onto the Department for establishing the
existence, or lack thereof, of unpreventable employee misconduct.
The Legislature enacted unpreventable employee misconduct as an
affirmative defense, requiring the employer to prove five distinct elements
to assert it.223 The Department’s WRD 27.00, rather than requiring the
employer to supply relevant evidence, directs DOSH compliance officers
to assess the likelihood of the availability of the defense before issuing a
citation. Further, the Department directs the officers to cite violations in
such a way as to require the Department to establish the lack of the
elements as part of its own case. Both these decisions are in contravention
of the Legislature’s decision regarding which party should have the
burden of proof.
B.

The Enforcement Policy Causes Confusion at the Board Level and
in the Superior Courts

The conflation of statutes, regulations, case law, and regional directives
with competing commands causes confused decisions at the Board level
that can then be exacerbated on review in Superior Court. After the Court
of Appeals decisions in J.E. Dunn and Martinez Megloza, the potential for
confusion at the Board is increased. Although general contractors are
supposed to be per se liable for a violation, an employer may attempt to
make an argument under the multi-employer worksite doctrine that the
general contractor was not, in fact, the “controlling” employer at the
worksite. The case law allowing for the inclusion of OSHA case law into
Washington state jurisprudence has also created potential for confusion.
The extension of Stute-like liability to job site owners and developers
without clear delineation by the courts and Department on the parameters
of each category’s responsibilities exacerbates this potential confusion.
This lack of clear delineation may lead to difficult questions upon review
in superior court. If, as a conclusion of law, the Board decides that an
employer is the “controlling” employer, or a general contractor, or only a
jobsite owner, then the superior court will review those decisions de novo.
However, if those same issues are decided as findings of fact, the court
will review the record under a substantial evidence standard. These
differing standards of review may lead to different results depending on
the artful arguing of an employer’s attorney. Because the Department’s
222. WISHA REGIONAL DIRECTIVE 27.00, supra note 164, at ¶ VI.
223. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.120(5) (2016).
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stance on jobsite responsibility is unclear, an employer has an incentive
to further muddy the waters in an attempt to keep open as many avenues
of non-liability as possible.
C.

The Department Should Change its Enforcement Policy

The Department should change its current citation policy to cite general
contractors for the underlying WISHA violation rather than WAC 296155-100(a). If, after an investigation, a compliance officer finds that a
subcontractor’s employee was exposed to a hazard on the jobsite,
Washington case law is clear that both the subcontractor and the general
contractor are liable for that hazard. The subcontractor is liable as the
employee’s employer and the general contractor is liable because of its
“innate supervisory authority” over the jobsite.224 Although the theories
of liability are different, the underlying conduct is the same. If the
underlying violation is failure to require a worker to wear fall protection
while working at a height of greater than four feet, both employers should
be cited under the same WAC. Both the subcontractor and the general
contractor violated the WAC by failing to require the employee to wear
the fall protection; the general contractor simply by virtue of its position
did not commit a distinct violation from the subcontractor of failing to
provide a safe workplace. Both employers failed to provide a safe
workplace, but they failed to do so by violating a specific WAC. While it
may be true that the general contractor violated both the specific WAC
and WAC 296-155-100(a) because of its managerial capacities, it is not
an either-or situation.
As J.E. Dunn has shifted the burden to the Department to essentially
prove the elements of unpreventable employee misconduct to uphold a
citation under WAC 296-155-100(a), the Department should not solely
cite this general regulation where the underlying regulation exists to
directly highlight the violative behavior.
D.

The Legislature Should Enact an Unpreventable Employee
Misconduct Statute for Stute Cases

Without considering the policy reasons for the Department’s current
citation decisions, the case law itself has created a conundrum that should
be addressed by the Legislature. Because the Court of Appeals foreclosed
the statutory defense of unpreventable employee misconduct in cases of
Stute liability, a general contractor cannot raise the defense against a
Department citation. Thus, if the Department cited a general contractor
224. Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 454, 464, 788 P.2d 545, 550 (1990).
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for violating a fall protection regulation and the general contractor has
sufficient evidence to fulfill the requirements of the affirmative defense,
the general contractor is legally unable to raise the defense. This is taking
per se liability too far.
The ruling in J.E. Dunn has likely influenced the Department’s
decision to continue to cite general contractors under the general
regulation, allowing employee misconduct to factor into the correctness
of a citation. However, as discussed above, this burden shifting is contrary
to the law and does not promote the safety of Washington’s workers.
Instead, the Legislature should expand the availability of the
unpreventable employee misconduct defense to allow general contractors
to raise it as an affirmative defense before the Board of Industrial
Insurance Appeals. This statutory fix will preserve the correct burdens on
the parties and will not require compliance officers to make on-site
charging decisions based on the likelihood of a potentially meritorious
defense. Instead, the compliance officer can simply cite the violation and
allow the employer to bring forward the evidence necessary to prove the
defense to the Board.
CONCLUSION
Since deciding Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc. in 1990, the Washington State
Supreme Court has taken an expansive view of liability for workplace
accidents. This view is supported both by the enactment of WISHA and
Washington’s constitutional worker safety mandate. The Department’s
policy decision to cite general contractors under the general duty
regulation—rather than under the actual regulation their subcontractors
violated—is in contravention of both the Washington State Supreme
Court’s rulings and the purposes of WISHA. While common sense reform
is needed to create a worker safety scheme that both protects workers and
promotes business, the Legislature—not the Department—must lead the
charge in clarifying and changing the law. Until the Legislature changes
the relevant statutes, or the Court limits the scope of general contractor
liability, the Department should follow a citation policy that comports
with the law as it currently exists.

